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ABSTRACT 
 
The study empirically examines changes in institutional ownership and analyst coverage in the 
years following conference call initiations. We find significant increases in both variables in the 
years following initiations of conference calls after controlling for confounding factors. These 
results complement prior research on the benefits of disclosures and suggest that expanded 
disclosures create additional institutional and analyst interest in stocks. 
 
Keywords:  Voluntary disclosures, conference calls, institutional ownership, analyst coverage 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines whether firms with improvements in voluntary disclosures experience increases 
in institutional interest and analyst coverage. Institutional investors and financial analysts play an 
important role in the capital markets and firms regard them a significant element for their success. 
Institutional investors are foremost a major source of capital but firms also consider them essential for creating a 
stable and informed shareholding that has a basic understanding of the company (e.g. Holland, 1998). Financial 
analysts produce, analyze and disseminate information about firms and contribute to the creation of more 
informative stock prices and higher stock liquidity. Analyst coverage has come into widespread use as a proxy for 
the richness of a firm's information environment (e.g. Lys and Soo, 1995; Brown and Higgins, 2002; Lang et al., 
2003, Charitou and Karamanou, 2009). 
 
Given the importance of financial analysts and institutional investors, it is imperative to investigate factors 
associated with their incentives to follow firms and more specifically the effect of disclosures on these incentives. 
Firms provide much of the information analysts and institutions use in their evaluations. Prior studies suggest that 
more informative disclosures affect intermediation for a firm‟s stock in the capital market by reducing information 
asymmetry (e.g. Barry and Brown 1984, 1985, Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994), lowering 
the cost of information acquisition (e.g. Bhushan, 1989a, 1989b; Lang and Lundhom, 1997), and increasing the 
firm‟s visibility (e.g. Merton, 1987; Fishman and Hagerty 1989).  
 
However, ex-ante the relation between disclosures and intermediation is complex and ambiguous. For 
example, disclosures can pre-empt analysts‟ ability to distribute managers‟ private information to investors, leading 
to a decline in their demand. Also disclosures can reduce institutions‟ competitive advantage and potential for 
profitable trading opportunities, thereby diminishing incentives to invest in the firm. So, it is not obvious ex-ante 
that the relation between disclosures, analyst coverage and institutional ownership is positive. 
 
We first investigate this relation by examining changes in institutional ownership and analyst coverage in 
the years following initiations of conference calls. Conference calls are ex-ante commitments to voluntary 
disclosure, and are interactive. That is, managers commit to quarterly meetings with analysts and institutions where 
they get the chance to elaborate on firm performance outside the normal accounting conventions, but most 
T 
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importantly get to answer questions from analysts and financial institutions. Both, institutions and analysts consider 
direct contacts with executives and spoken dialogue among the most important sources for financial information 
(AIMR, 2001)
i
.   
 
In addition, we also examine the effect of regulation FD on this relation. Before regulation FD, the majority 
of conference calls in the sample restricted access to invited professionals (“closed” conference calls). Regulation 
FD, implemented in October of 2000, requires firms to make material disclosures broadly available and is likely to 
influence the effect of conference calls on analysts‟ coverage and institutional ownership. The direction of this 
effect, however, is ambiguous and depends on many factors, such as the effect of the regulation on the quality of 
information disclosed through conference calls, and the reaction of institutions and analysts to the regulation in 
terms of investments in private information acquisition. An unequivocal change is that, while before regulation FD 
analysts and institutions could maintain their information advantage over other investors, disclosures after the 
regulation reduce this competitive advantage and possibly their willingness to cover and/or invest in the company. 
The effect of the regulation on this relation is thus an empirical question. To shed light on this, we compare changes 
in analyst coverage and institutional ownership in the pre and post FD era.  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that analyst coverage and institutional ownership increase in the years 
following initiations of conference calls. These findings complement similar evidence from prior studies that use 
alternative measures of disclosure. We find no significant evidence of a differential effect on this relation in the 
post-FD era.   
 
Three prior studies use the summary AIMR ratings of firms‟ disclosures to document that more highly-
rated disclosures are associated with greater analyst following (Lang and Lundholm,1996; Healy et al., 1999) and 
greater ownership by transient institutional investors (Bushee and Noe, 2000). However, the sample firms covered in 
these studies are already large and widely followed. A related problem with AIMR measures of disclosure is that it 
is difficult to precisely define the timing of any change in disclosure, making it difficult to infer whether disclosure 
changes followed or preceded changes in the variables of interest (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Conference calls, on the 
other hand, allow research on disclosure policies of small- and medium-sized firms in more recent years. 
Furthermore, the timing and initiation of conference calls is known, which makes it possible to perform powerful 
tests on changes in the variables of interest. The paper also differs from Francis et al. (1997) that examine the effect 
of analyst-initiated presentations on analyst following and forecast properties. In our study, conference calls are 
initiated by the firms and are targeted not only to analysts but also to institutional investors. So, firm-initiated 
conference calls are more likely to capture attempts to attract these individuals to the firm. 
 
The paper contributes to literature on voluntary disclosures, analyst coverage and institution ownership. 
Bushman and Smith (2001) highlight the need to test hypotheses concerning differential economic effects of 
disclosures of various types. This paper shows that expanded disclosure, through conference calls, contributes to 
increases in institutional ownership and analyst coverage. Also, given the importance that firms place on analyst 
coverage and institutional ownership, incentives of analysts to follow firms and institutions to invest in firms is of 
primary interest to academics and practitioners. The study shows that analysts and institutions are attracted to firms 
with a higher quality of voluntary disclosures. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review related literature and 
introduce the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the empirical design and variable measurement. Sample selection and 
characteristics are presented in Section 4 and empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Institutional Ownership and Disclosures 
 
As previously stated managers value institutional investors‟ interests and often use disclosures not only to 
increase the firm‟s visibility but also to signal the value of their firm, and increase institutional investors‟ confidence 
in the firm‟s strategy (Holland,1998). Close relations with institutional investors enable managers to create a stable 
and informed shareholding, and ensure that major investors have a basic understanding of the company (and are not 
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surprised by events or news affecting the company). A NIRI survey in 1996 indicated that conference calls in 
particular, were targeted not only to current institutional investors but also to potential institutional investors. From a 
sample of 147 conference call companies, 77% invited potential institutional investors to listen to the conference 
call.  
 
Corporate disclosure practices are likely to influence institutional investors for a number of reasons. 
Diamond and Verrechia (1991) show that a high level of disclosures reduces information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders, which improves liquidity and lessens the price impact of large trades. Improved liquidity is 
likely to attract institutional investors‟ interests since they tend to prefer firms with a greater trading volume and 
higher liquidity (Gompers and Metrick, 1998). Institutional investors could also be sensitive to corporate disclosure 
practices if disclosure enables them to evaluate and analyze a firm‟s performance more effectively and increase their 
potential for profitable trading opportunities (Bushee and Noe, 2000). Finally, disclosure practices are important to 
active institutional investors if they rely on that information for corporate governance activities (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Bushman et al. (2004) argue that information is a critical part of effective 
corporate governance mechanisms. Active institutional investors are therefore more likely to follow firms which are 
more transparent and committed to more forthcoming disclosures. 
 
Prior research finds that institutions prefer firms with higher quality disclosures. Healy et al. (1999) and 
Bushee and Noe (2000) documented that firms which expanded voluntary disclosures, as measured by increases in 
analyst disclosure ratings (AIMR scores), experienced increases in institutional ownership. Drawing on this, we 
expect initiations of conference calls to have a positive impact on institutional ownership: 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Institutional ownership increases in the years following initiation of conference calls. 
 
Disclosure could, however, also erode profit opportunities if it substitutes for private information 
collection. In October, 2000 the SEC passed regulation FD that prohibits firms from disclosing material information 
to a select group of participants without simultaneously disclosing the same information to the public. It is plausible 
that regulation FD has an effect on the relation between conference calls and institutional investors. However, this 
effect is likely to depend on many factors. For example, assuming that regulation FD has its intended effect of 
“leveling the playing field” without compromising the quality of disclosed information, then the effect of regulation 
FD on institutions will depend on the source of their competitive advantage. If disclosures through conference calls 
substitute for private information collection then institutions loose a competitive advantage and will have lesser 
incentives to invest. However, if their competitive advantage is derived from their superior ability to interpret public 
information then the regulation should have no effect on institutional investors. Complicating things further, is the 
ambiguous effect of the regulation on the information flow to the market place. There is an ongoing debate on the 
effect of regulation FD on the quality of information disclosed, with some arguing for a chilling of the information 
flow (e.g. Duarte et al.,2007) and others arguing for improvements or no change in the information flow (e.g. Heflin 
et al., 2003). Thus, stated in its null form the hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Regulation FD has no effect on institutional ownership in the years following initiations of 
conference calls. 
 
Analyst Coverage and Disclosures 
 
As with institutional investors, managers appear to value analyst coverage and try to attract analysts to the 
firm. The relation between analyst coverage and firm disclosures mainly depends on how disclosures provided by 
firms affect the supply and demand for analyst services (Bushan, 1989b; Lang and Lundhold, 1996). 
 
Disclosures provided by firms usually lower the cost of information acquisition by analysts and hence 
increases their supply. Thus, ceteris paribus, an increase in firm disclosures is expected to increase analyst coverage. 
The effect of firm disclosures on the demand for analyst services depends on whether analysts are primarily 
information providers or information intermediaries (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). If analysts are primarily 
information providers then firm disclosures could pre-empt (substitute for) the analyst report and hence decrease the 
demand for their services. If, on the other hand, analysts are primarily information intermediaries then firm 
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disclosure complements the analyst report, enables analysts to create valuable new information and hence increases 
demand for their services.  
 
In sum, ex-ante, the effect of firm disclosure on analyst coverage depends on their net effect on the 
aggregate supply and demand curves for analyst services. Nevertheless, extant limited prior research on this area 
showed that analysts and firm disclosure are complements but  and not substitutes. Healy et al. (1999) document 
increased analyst coverage in firms with expanded voluntary disclosures and Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that 
firms with more informative disclosures have higher analyst coverage. Consistent with these findings, the analyst 
community appears to value firm provided disclosures in general and conference calls in particular. In an AIMR 
survey (AIMR, 2000), portfolio managers and investment analysts ranked spoken dialogue with company 
executives, analysts‟ conferences and conference calls to be among the most important sources of financial or 
corporate information. Drawing on the above, we expect initiations of conference calls to have a positive impact on 
analyst coverage. This hypothesis is formalized below: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Analyst coverage increases in the years following initiations of conference calls. 
 
Regulation FD is also likely to have an impact on the demand and supply for analyst services. As discussed 
above, the direction of the impact depends on the effect of regulation FD on the quality of information disclosed 
through conference calls, but also on whether analysts are primarily information providers or intermediaries. The 
regulation is also likely to have a differential effect on analysts depending on brokerage house affiliation and their 
relation with managers (e.g. Gintschel and Markov, 2004). Based on the aforementioned discussion, we form the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2b:  Regulation FD has no effect on analyst coverage in the years following initiations of conference 
calls.  
 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
 
We used time-series analysis to test our hypotheses. One of the advantages of a temporal analysis is that by 
using each firm as its own control over time, it allows for the control of firm-specific characteristics which are 
constant over time and helps isolate the effect related to the event. In the models to be estimated, each dependent 
variable is modeled as depending on company fixed effects, a set of conference call dummies and a set of controls:  
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where fi denotes a company‟s fixed effect,
2-0
itCcall  is a dummy variable corresponding to the years after initiation of 
conference calls, and FDi is a dummy variable intended to capture the effect of regulation FD. 
 
The primary coefficients of interest are α2 and β2. Positive and statistically significant coefficients would 
indicate that firms show larger improvements in institutional ownership and analyst coverage in the years following 
initiations of conference calls than the years prior to conference call initiations. Coefficients α3 and β3 show 
differences in the two test variables in the post-FD era versus the pre-FD era. Positive coefficients would indicate 
larger improvements in the test variables following initiations of conference calls in the post-FD era and negative 
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coefficients would indicate a lesser improvement in the post-FD era.  
 
We follow prior research to include a large number of control variables that were shown to be associated 
with disclosure quality, institutional ownership and analyst following. For the institutional ownership model we 
mostly follow Bushee and Noe (2000). We use returns on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary items 
to total assets, to proxy for firm performance which has been shown to be positively associated with institutional 
ownership and disclosure quality. The natural logarithm of average monthly dollar volume over the fiscal year 
captures institutional preferences for more liquid stocks. The natural logarithm of market value controls for size. We 
include leverage, measured as long-term debt to total assets, and the natural logarithm of standard deviation of 
monthly returns to proxy for different dimensions of risk. Higher financial leverage was shown to be associated with 
higher levels of institutional ownership, while higher levels of idiosyncratic risk are associated with lower levels of 
institutional ownership (Bushee and Noe, 2000). We control for institutional preferences for firms listed in the S&P 
500 index by including an indicator variable that takes the value of “1” if the firm is listed in the S&P 500 index and 
zero otherwise. 
 
In the analyst coverage specification we use a number of controls to proxy for analysts‟ incentives to follow 
the firm. The natural logarithm of average monthly dollar volume over the fiscal year and the market value of equity 
issued proxy for potential underwriting revenues (Bricker et al., 1999). Firm size, measured as the logarithm of the 
market value of equity, is used to proxy for potential analyst revenue and demand for analyst services (Bushan, 
1999a; O‟Brien and Bushan, 1990; Brennan and Hughes ,1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Most studies find that 
analysts tend to prefer lower risk firms whose earnings are more predictable. We use the standard deviation of 
returns, the standard deviation of return on assets and the number of business segments to proxy for different 
dimensions of risk and firm complexity. The closing stock price at fiscal year end is used to proxy for analysts‟ 
preference for low-priced stocks due to proportionally higher brokerage commissions (Brennan and Hughes, 1991). 
We control for analysts‟ preference for firms listed in the S&P 500 index by including an indicator variable that 
takes the value of “1” if the firm is listed in the S&P 500 index and zero otherwise.  
 
Finally, in both models we include dividend yield, price-earnings ratio, book to market ratio and sales 
growth to capture changes in fundamentals that can simultaneously affect changes in disclosure quality, analyst 
coverage and institutional ownership (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Bushee, 2001). 
 
Models (1) and (2) are estimated using fixed effects regressions. In addition, both models are estimated 
using changes specification in order to strengthen the empirical findings and mitigate the potential for omitted 
variable bias. 
  
SAMPLE SELECTION AND CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Conference call data are identified from Thomson Financial First Call, an information provider to 
institutional investors. First Call maintains a dataset of daily conference call schedules from 1995 to 2004, which we 
used to identify firms hosting conference calls. The initiation year of conference calls is the earliest year a firm 
appears in the database. Institutional holdings are obtained from Spectrum. Analyst coverage is the number of 
analysts with at least one earnings forecast in the I/B/E/S dataset during the fiscal year. Control variables on volume, 
stock price and returns are obtained from CRSP and control variables on financial information are obtained from 
Compustat.  
 
All variables in the analysis are industry adjusted except the indicator variable for whether the firm is 
included in the S&P 500 index. Industry adjusted values are estimated for each firm-year as the difference between 
the sample firm‟s value and the median value for firms in the same 4-digit SIC code in the same fiscal yearii. Firms 
with less than five peers in the same SIC industry classification code and firms with negative book value of equity 
are excluded from the sample. Firms included in the sample must have at least one quarterly conference call a year 
in the two years following initiation of conference calls. Firms with missing observations on any of the control 
variables are excluded from the sample. As a final screening requirement, sample firms must have available data in 
the year prior to conference call initiation.  
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Table I-Panel A:  Time Distribution of the 2399 Conference Call Initiations Occurring between 1995 and 2002 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
N 499 394 301 295 307 312 261 30 2399 
Pct. Sample 20.80% 16.42% 12.55% 12.30% 12.80% 13.01% 10.88% 1.25% 100.00% 
 
 
Table I-Panel B:  Industry Distribution of the 3488 Conference Call Initiations 1995 and 2002 
2-digit SIC Industry Description Number Pct. of Sample 
10 Metal Mining 19 0.79% 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 72 3.00% 
15 Bldg Cnstr-Gen Contr, Op Bldr 17 0.71% 
20 Food and Kindred Products 29 1.21% 
22 Textile Mill Products 16 0.67% 
23 Apparel and Other Finished Pds 22 0.92% 
24 Lumber and Wood Pds, Ex Furn 11 0.46% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 15 0.63% 
26 Paper and Allied Products 25 1.04% 
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied 33 1.38% 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 188 7.84% 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Inds 14 0.58% 
30 Rubber and Misc Plastics Prods 19 0.79% 
31 Leather and Leather Products 12 0.50% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 33 1.38% 
34 Fabr Metal, Ex Machy, Trans Eq 28 1.17% 
35 Indl, Comml Machy, Computer Eq 163 6.79% 
36 Electr, Oth Elec Eq, Ex Cmp 214 8.92% 
37 Transportation Equipment 49 2.04% 
38 Meas Instr;Photo Gds;Watches 161 6.71% 
39 Misc Manufacturng Industries 20 0.83% 
42 Motor Freight Trans, Warehous 10 0.42% 
44 Water Transportation 10 0.42% 
45 Transportation By Air 10 0.42% 
48 Communications 65 2.71% 
49 Electric, Gas, Sanitary Serv 61 2.54% 
50 Durable Goods-Wholesale 52 2.17% 
51 Nondurable Goods-Wholesale 29 1.21% 
53 General Merchandise Stores 12 0.50% 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 29 1.21% 
57 Home Furniture and Equip Store 13 0.54% 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 31 1.29% 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 46 1.92% 
60 Depository Institutions 113 4.71% 
61 Nondepository Credit Institutions 23 0.96% 
62 Security and Commodity Brokers 18 0.75% 
63 Insurance Carriers 71 2.96% 
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 11 0.46% 
65 Real Estate 12 0.50% 
67 Holding, Other Invest Offices 95 3.96% 
73 Business Services 325 13.55% 
78 Motion Pictures 10 0.42% 
79 Amusement and Recreation Svcs 18 0.75% 
80 Health Services 33 1.38% 
87 Engr, Acc, Resh, Mgmt, Rel Svcs 40 1.67% 
 Other 102 4.25% 
Total  2399 100.00% 
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The final sample consists of 2,399 unique firms and 12,661 firm-year observations. Table I presents the 
industry and time distribution of the sample firms. The sample covers a large number of industries with the largest 
concentration in the business services industry (2-digit SIC 73), 325 firms in this industry initiate conference calls 
during the sample period, followed by the electrical equipment industry (2-digit SIC 36) with 214 firms and the 
chemical products industry (2-digit SIC 28) with 188 firms. It is noteworthy that these industries are usually 
classified as high technology industries with high uncertainty and growth and less informative financial statements. 
So, consistent with Tasker (1998a) these firms are more likely to be in need of conference calls in order to 
complement their less informative financial statements. The distribution of conference call initiations across time is 
almost uniform except for the year 2002 with only 30 initiations. This is mostly due to sample restrictions since we 
require sample firms to have conference calls in the two years following the year of initiation. 
 
We initially compare the sample firms on selected ratios before and after the initiation of conference calls 
using the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks matched-pairs test. The results are 
presented in table II. For ease of interpretation we present statistics on the unadjusted variables in this table. Results 
in this table suggest that there is a significant increase in both institutional ownership and analyst coverage in the 
three years following initiation of conference calls as compared with the three years prior to initiation. Institutional 
ownership averages 41% after initiation as compared to 35% before the initiation of conference calls. Analyst 
coverage averages 6.9 after initiation and 6.3 in the years before initiation of conference calls. Both results are 
consistent with the hypotheses of this study. Results in table also suggest that sample firms experience a decline in 
growth following initiations of conference calls. This is indicated by the significant decrease in dividend yield, price 
to earnings and sales growth and from the significant increase in book to market ratio as compared to the three years 
prior to conference call initiations.  The underlying change in fundamentals suggests that it is important to control 
for these variables in the multivariate analysis in order to isolate the effect of conference calls.  
  
 Table II reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms. For each variable the mean (median) is presented 
in the top (bottom) row. The “after” column presents the averages for the three years following initiation of 
conference calls and the “before” column presents the averages for the three years before initiation. Institutional 
ownership is the quarterly average percentage of institutional holdings during the fiscal year. Analyst coverage is the 
number of analysts with at least one earnings forecast in the I/B/E/S dataset during the fiscal year  Div. yield is the 
ratio of dividends (CS#21) to market value of equity (CS#24
equity (CS#24*CS#25) to income before extraordinary items (CS#18). Book to market is the ratio of book value of 
equity (CS#60) to market value of equity (CS#24*CS#25). Sales growth is the percentage change in annual sales 
(CS#12). All variables are winsorized at 2% and 98% to avoid the effect of outliers. 
 
Table II:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable After (N=6860) Before (N=5403) Difference t-value Wilcoxon 
Institutional Ownership 0.411 0.355 0.056 13.29 -12.83 
 0.412 0.333 0.079   
Analyst Coverage 6.954 6.350 0.604 4.91 -11.67 
 5.000 4.000 1.000   
Div. Yield 0.010 0.012 -0.002 -5.70 7.27 
 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Price/Earnings 15.872 17.140 -1.268 -1.61 5.38 
 14.455 15.670 -1.215   
Book to Market 0.602 0.500 0.102 12.43 -7.99 
 0.465 0.422 0.043   
Sales Growth 0.274 0.574 -0.301 -10.56 6.74 
 0.137 0.157 -0.020   
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
 In table III we present mean and median industry-adjusted institutional ownership and analyst coverage 
during the event years -3 to 2. Both a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test are used to assess whether the variables 
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are significantly different from zero in the event years and whether there is a significant difference in the pre- and 
post-initiation period. Throughout the event period sample firms have significantly higher institutional ownership 
and analyst coverage compared to their industry peers. The mean (median) industry-adjusted institutional ownership 
is 9% (6%) in the pre-initiation year and 13% (11%) in the post-initiation year. Consistent with prior research, this 
finding suggests that conference calls are initiated not only to attract new institutional investors but also as a 
response to pressure from existing institutions to provide more information (e.g. Ajinkya et al., 2005). More 
importantly, results in table II indicate that there is a significant increase in institutional ownership in the years 
following the initiation of conference calls. The mean (median) difference between the pre-initiation period (-3,-1) 
and the post-initiation period (0, 2) is 4% (5%) and it is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
 
 Analyst coverage presents a similar pattern. The mean (median) industry-adjusted analyst coverage is 5.3 
(3) in the pre-initiation period and 5.5 (4) in the post-initiation period. The mean (median) difference between the 
pre- and post-initiation period is 0.24 (1) and is statistically significant at the 0.1 level using a t-test and at the 0.001 
using Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, two-tailed. Notwithstanding, the weaker pattern of analyst coverage, evidence 
suggests that both pressure from existing analysts and attempts to attract new analysts are partly behind conference 
call initiations.  
 
 Overall, the evidence presented in this table is consistent with significant increases in institutional 
ownership and analyst coverage following initiations of conference calls. However, the findings should be 
interpreted with caution because these tests do not control for contemporaneous changes in other factors that may 
affect the variables of interest. 
 
 A t-test and Wincoxon signed rank test are used to test whether there is a significant change in the mean 
and median for sample firms in the years of the disclosure increase (years 0 to 2) relative to the pre-event period 
(years -3 to -1). # and & indicate level of significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively (Table III).  
 
 
Table III:  Industry Adjusted Institutional Ownership and Analyst Coverage around Initiations of Conference Calls 
  Year Relative to Event Pre-Initiation Post-Initiation Difference 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 (-3,-1) (0,2)  
Institutional 
Ownership 
Mean 0.1# 0.1# 0.08# 0.11# 0.13# 0.14# 0.09# 0.13# -0.04# 
Median 0.07# 0.06# 0.04# 0.09# 0.12# 0.13# 0.06# 0.11# -0.05# 
N 1362 1642 2399 2399 2281 2180 5403 6860  
 Year Relative to Event Pre-Initiation Post-Initiation Difference 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 (-3,-1) (0,2)  
Analyst 
Coverage 
Mean 5.99# 5.61# 4.70# 5.40# 5.62# 5.61# 5.30# 5.54# -0.24& 
Median 3.00# 3.00# 2.00# 3.50# 4.00# 4.00# 3.00# 4.00# -1.00# 
N 1362 1642 2399 2399 2281 2180 5403 6860  
 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
In table IV we present multivariate results. Models (1) and (2) are estimated using a fixed effects regression 
controlling for other factors that may affect the variables of interest. Model (1) explains roughly 85% of the 
variation of industry-adjusted institutional ownership and is highly significant. Significant α2 coefficient indicates 
significant increases in institutional ownership in the years following conference call initiation. Consistent with the 
univariate findings in table III, these results suggest that conference calls attract institutional interest. Regulation FD 
does not appear to have any effect on this relation. Coefficient α3 is not significantly different from zero suggesting 
that the relation between conference calls and institutional ownership does not change in the post-regulation FD 
environment.  
 
Control variables are generally consistent with prior research. The coefficient on return on assets is 
negative and significant at p<0.1 indicating that institutions prefer firms with recent poor performance. The 
coefficients on market value of equity and dollar volume are both positive and statistically significant capturing 
institutional investors‟ preferences for larger firms with higher levels of trading volume. Institutional investors 
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prefer firms with less idiosyncratic risk as indicated by the significant negative coefficient on the standard deviation 
of returns. Finally, institutional ownership is negatively correlated with dividend yield and sales growth and 
positively correlated with price to earnings and book to market. 
 
Model (2) explains 90% of the variation of industry-adjusted analyst coverage and is highly significant. 
The significant β2 coefficient indicates a significant increase in analyst coverage in the years following initiation of 
conference calls. Similar to the institutional ownership model, coefficient β3 is not statistically significant, indicating 
that regulation FD has no effect on this relation. Overall, our evidence implies that firm disclosures and information 
production by analysts are complements, thus supporting similar findings by prior studies (Lang and Lundholm, 
1996; Healy et al., 1999). 
 
Control variables are consistent with our expectations. Analysts prefer to follow larger firms, and firms 
with higher market value of trading volume, partially due to higher underwriting fees. Also, analysts prefer to follow 
firms with less uncertainty and firms with more predictable earnings as indicated by the significant negative 
coefficients on the standard deviation of returns and the standard deviation of return on assets. The coefficient on 
stock price is negative and significant capturing analysts‟ preferences for low priced stocks. More analysts follow 
firms listed on the S&P 500 index and firms with higher book-to-market ratio. Finally, analyst coverage is 
negatively correlated with abnormally high sales growth probably due to higher uncertainty in these firms. 
 
In columns 2 and 4 of table IV the analysis is performed using changes specifications. In the changes 
regressions all variables except the dummy variables are changes from the previous year. Results from these 
regressions are generally consistent with the results from the fixed effects models. The models explain roughly 15% 
and 12% of the variation of industry adjusted changes in institutional ownership and analyst coverage, respectively. 
In both models there is a significant increase in the changes of institutional ownership and analyst coverage 
following initiation of conference calls. Overall, the results presented in table IV are consistent with our hypotheses 
and suggest that institutional ownership and analyst coverage increase following initiations of conference calls.  
  
 Table IV reports estimates of the effect of conference call initiations on institutional ownership and analyst 
coverage. For each dependent variable we provide results for both fixed effects regression and  changes regression. 
In the changes regressions all variables except the dummy variables are changes from the previous year. Institutional 
ownership is the quarterly average percentage of institutional holdings during the fiscal year. Analyst coverage is the 
number of analysts with at least one earnings forecast in the I/B/E/S dataset during the fiscal year.  Ccall
0-2
 is a 
dummy variable capturing the three years following initiation of conference calls (one in the three years after 
initiation and zero otherwise). FD is a dummy variable capturing the effect of regulation FD (one if the fiscal year is 
after the regulation and zero otherwise). ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items (CS#`8) to total 
assets (CS#6). Volume is the market value of average monthly traded volume. Issue is the market value of equity 
(CS#108) issued over the fiscal year. Market value is the market value of the firm at fiscal end (CS#25 *CS#199). 
Std Returns is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the fiscal year. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt 
(CS#9) to total assets (CS #6). Std Roa is the standard deviation of returns on assets for the 12 quarters prior to the 
fiscal year end (CS#18/CS#6). No. Segments is the number of business segments the firm operates in. Price is the 
closing price at fiscal yearend (CS#199). S&P 500 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is 
listed in the S&P 500 and zero otherwise. Div. yield is the ratio of dividends (CS#21) to market value of equity 
extraordinary items (CS#18). Book to market is the ratio of book value of equity (CS#60) to market value of equity 
(CS#24*CS#25). Sales growth is the percentage change in annual sales (CS#12). All variables are industry adjusted 
by the same 4-digit SIC code except for the dummy variables. Fiscal year dummies are included in all regressions 
but the coefficients are not reported for brevity. Levels of significance are indicated by ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 2% and 98% to avoid the effect of outliers. 
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Table IV:  Regressions of Institutional Ownership and Analyst Coverage on Conference Call Time Dummies 
  Institutional Ownership Number of Analysts 
  Fixed Effects Changes Fixed Effects Changes 
Intercept  -0.007  -0.534 
  (-0.30)  (-1.22) 
Ccall0-2 0.020 0.018 0.689 0.195 
 (5.54)*** (6.30)*** (7.86)*** (3.49)*** 
Ccall0-2 * FD -0.002 -0.003 0.032 0.052 
 (-0.34) (-0.39) (0.20) (0.36) 
ROA -0.015 0.015   
 (-1.89)* (2.23)**   
Log(volume) 0.027 0.028 0.613 0.473 
 (18.70)*** (22.03)*** (17.87)*** (18.23)*** 
Log (issue)   -0.160 -0.086 
   (-8.14)*** (-6.35)*** 
Log(MV) 0.047 0.034 0.733 0.688 
 (20.11)*** (17.18)*** (12.72)*** (16.33)*** 
Log(std. returns) -0.019 -0.016 -0.174 -0.177 
 (-5.96)*** (-6.20)*** (-2.40)** (-3.52)*** 
Leverage 0.003 0.023   
 (0.28) (2.00)**   
Std. ROA   -1.781 -4.095 
   (-2.55)** (-5.38)*** 
No. Segments   -0.001 0.039 
   (-0.03) (1.31) 
Stock Price   -0.013 -0.006 
   (-4.64)*** (-2.90)*** 
S&P 500 -0.047 -0.010 1.535 -0.379 
 (-4.49)*** (-2.96)*** (6.20)*** (-5.66)*** 
Div. Yield -0.402 -0.490 2.098 7.264 
 (-3.05)*** (-3.62)*** (0.67) (2.68)*** 
Price/Earnings 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (2.27)** (0.38) (1.36) (1.12) 
Book to Market 0.021 0.020 0.574 0.570 
 (5.96)*** (5.96)*** (6.91)*** (8.60)*** 
Sales Growth -0.002 0.000 -0.106 -0.002 
 (-3.42)*** (-3.73)*** (-6.35)*** (-0.90) 
Fiscal Year Dummies Included Included Include Included 
     
F-Statistic 24.82 81.53 40.40 62.37 
R-square 85.93% 15.07% 90.87% 12.82% 
N 12261 11053 12261 11053 
 
 
Robustness Tests 
 
We conduct several robustness tests to increase confidence in our findings. Alternatively, the models are 
estimated using a balance panel of 1,230 unique firms with available information in all six years in the event period. 
Results are generally unchanged for institutional ownership but there is no evidence of a differential effect for 
analysts. It is worth noting that in the balanced panel the sample firms are larger by construction (due to 
survivorship bias). Given the richness of the information environment in larger firms, the marginal impact of an 
increase in disclosure may not be large enough to attract additional analyst interest.  
 
To investigate the difference between firms that regularly conduct conference calls and those that do not, 
we repeated the empirical analysis on a sample of firms that conducted conference calls for only the year of 
initiation. The empirical evidence on institutional ownership and analyst coverage did not hold for these firms, 
indicating that the commitment to regular conference calls is the driving force behind the findings. 
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As a final robustness test, models (1) and (2) are estimated using a simultaneous equation analysis where 
analyst coverage enters the institutional ownership equation and vice-versa. The simultaneous equation analysis is 
intended to account for the inter-relation between analysts and institutions and thus control for simultaneity bias 
(Ackert and Athanasakos, 2003; O‟Brien and Bhushan, 1990). Results from the simultaneous equation analysis are 
generally consistent with the results from both the fixed effects and changes models. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study presents an empirical analysis of the relation between institutional ownership, analyst coverage 
and voluntary disclosures. The findings suggest that institutional ownership and analyst coverage increase in the 
years following initiations of conference calls, after controlling for confounding effects. The evidence complements 
prior research on the consequences of voluntary disclosures (Healy et al., 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). In 
addition, the study examines the effect of regulation FD on this relation. The results from the empirical analysis 
suggest no significant difference in the relation between conference calls and institutional ownership or analyst 
coverage in the post regulation FD era.  
 
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution since the tests primarily focus on associations 
and there is no claim of casual direction between these relations. Even though the panel data design allows for more 
powerful tests, correlated omitted variables may be driving the findings of the paper. For example, if conference 
calls are complements to other venues of disclosure, like public financial reports or press releases then the results 
may be driven by those disclosures rather than conference calls per se. Also, a change in a firm‟s disclosure policy, 
analyst coverage and institutional ownership may be simultaneously driven by a change in a firm‟s primitive 
characteristics not controlled for in the paper. To mitigate this problem, we included a vast number of control 
variables.  
 
Taken at face value, the empirical results presented in this study suggest that an economic benefit for firms 
that make extensive voluntary disclosures is the increased interest by analyst and institutional investors. Given the 
importance of analysts and institutions in the capital market and their significance for public firms, the study 
suggests that a way to attract them is by increasing the information disclosed to the market. 
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i Brown et al. (2004) proxy for information asymmetry using the Probalility of Informed Trade (PIN) and show that firms 
initiating conference calls experience long term reduction in information asymmetry.  
ii We also performed the analysis using mean industry adjusted variables with qualitatively similar results.  
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